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Emerging concerns about competitiveness induce a growing number of firms to outsource their
outbound transportation operations to third-party logistics providers. The resulting increase in the
number of actors often leads to sub-optimal supply chain actions due to the antagonistic nature of the
economic objectives of the partners. With the aim of determining possible deviations from the optimal
system performance in such supply chains, this study analyzes the contractual relation between a
retailer and a third-party logistics provider (carrier) using game theoretical approaches.
We consider a two-level supply chain with a carrier and a retailer. The retailer, R, owns a wa-
rehouse, where an infinite quantity of a single item is stored, and a store which faces a stochastic
demand for this item. The carrier, C, is in possession of an infinite number of trucks. The problem
is to determine the number of trucks that will be reserved for the deliveries between the warehouse
and the store before the uncertainty is resolved. Backorders are allowed but the retailer must satisfy
a minimum proportion of the final demand, u, which is determined exogeneously. Moreover, each
truck used has a maximum load, maxcap.
Different costs are incured during the process. First, the carrier pays a fixed price c1 per truck re-
served before uncertainty is resolved. Once demand is realized, if the number of trucks is insufficient,
the carrier has the opportunity to requisition additional trucks at a higher price c2 > c1. Finally, each
item shipped incurs a transportation cost r and is sold at the price of s.
In order to ensure a minimum service level, the retailer submits a contract to the carrier. This
contract is composed of two terms (a, p)where a is the amount paid by the carrier per truck effectively
used by the carrier and p is the price paid per item transported.
In this Stackelberg game, the following sequence of events occurs : before the demand is realised,
(1) the retailer proposes the contract to the carrier ; (2) if the carrier accepts this contract, he decides
how many trucks he reserves ; once the demand is known, (3) the carrier decides to requisition ad-
ditional trucks or not and to satisfy the whole or a fraction of the demand following the contract
specifications.
Finally, the problem faced by each member of the supply chain is the following. The carrier has
a two-stage problem. In the first stage, when demand is still uncertain, he has to decide the capacity
that he reserves, Y . In the second stage, when demand x is known, he decides the additional capa-
city, Z, obtained by requisitionning trucks and the quantity that he transports, Q. He also has some
constraints. Each truck cannot carry more than maxcap items. The carrier must at least satisfy a mi-
nimum proportion of the demand, u.x, but he cannot transport more than the demanded amount. On
the other side, the retailer’s profit depends on the quantity shipped, Q, on the number of backorders,
V and on the number of trucks used, Y +Z. Beside the nonnegativity constraints, the retailer only has
to ensure that the carrier accepts the contract. In order to simplify the computations, we suppose that
all the decision variables Y , Z, Q and V are continuous.
We first determine the optimal contract for the retailer and how the whole system behaves under
this contract. To obtain the optimal values of the two parameters a and p, we study the carrier’s
reaction to any proposed contract by the retailer. After, knowing the carrier’s response function, we
are able to compute the optimal values of a and p for the retailer. Finaly, we compare this situation
with a centralized model where a single decision maker manages everything.
Numerical analysis are conducted to study the effects of capacity, variability of demand, reserva-
tion and requisition costs. The results show that the contract may coordinate the supply chain under
some conditions on the parameters. In most cases, the gap between the optimal benefits of the cen-
tralized model and the decentralized model is small. As the Stackelberg leader, the retailer captures
the greatest part of the profits.
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